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CONGRESS IN THE “NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER.”
Peter E. Quint

In his new book, Mark Tushnet argues that,
through a gradual process of change, a “new
constitutional order” has replaced the prior structure
of politics extending from the New Deal through the
aftermath of the Great Society. The new order is
characterized by divided government and a minimalist
politics of “chastened aspirations.” Tushnet’s
argument differs from Bruce Ackerman’s view of modern
constitutional development in at least two important
ways. First, Tushnet argues that a new constitutional
order began to emerge during the Reagan administration
and was “consolidated” under Clinton, whereas Ackerman
finds that the most recent constitutional shift took
place under the New Deal. Second, Tushnet sees the
development of new constitutional orders as a gradual
process, whereas Ackerman asserts that rapid
constitutional change can occur during relatively
short “constitutional moments.”
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In the course of this exposition, Tushnet draws
on a broad array of political science analyses, as
well as judicial decisions and commentary. One of the
most persistent themes (or sub-themes) of this
argument relates to the position of Congress -- both
in its constitutionally-authorized role as maker of
basic policy on the federal level, as well as its
relationship with other branches of government,
particularly the judiciary.
Without taking a position on the differences
between Tushnet and Ackerman, or on the question of
whether it is ultimately preferable to refer to the
present situation as involving a “new constitutional
order”, I would like to direct my comments toward two
aspects of the present status of Congress that emerge
with some clarity from Tushnet’s account. The first is
the further decline in the role and effectiveness of
Congress in the post-Reagan period. This decline seems
to be a continuation of a relatively constant trend
since World War II -- broken only by transitory
moments of increased congressional assertiveness, for
example in the 1970s following Watergate and the
Vietnam War. The second development is relatively new
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-- involving the Supreme Court’s imposition of
limitations on congressional authority in a manner
that has not been evident since the 1930s.

A. Decline of Congress as an Institution
The illustrations assembled by Tushnet underscore
the decline of the representative and deliberative
functions of Congress. Indeed the general trend of
sharply reduced voter participation underscores the
decline in the representative nature of Congress -creating a further separation of the representatives
and their constituents. Relying on financial
contributions from a relatively small portion of the
population, representatives lose contact with the
electorate or the population. Furthermore, in a system
in which a reduced electorate participates, the most
extreme or “ideological” members of the constituency
wield disproportionate electoral control -- thereby
skewing the representative function of Congress. The
result is that “politics has become dominated by
relatively small groups of voters, and not by party
organizations.”(p. 13). Accordingly, “members of
Congress are increasingly unresponsive to the overall
views of their constituents.” (p. 14). Moreover, the
3

system of primary elections -- replacing the older
party system -- seems to further this trend by often
favoring “highly partisan individuals” who “select
themselves as potential candidates.” (p. 15). An
unexpected variation on the theme of nonrepresentation appeared during the Clinton
impeachment, when a lame-duck (and “highly partisan”)
House of Representatives voted to impeach President
Clinton even after electoral results indicated popular
objection to this process. (pp. 26-27.)
The deliberative quality of legislative work in
Congress also seems to suffer. Polarizing mass
mailings by well financed interest groups may stiffen
resistance to discussion and compromise. (See p. 12,
quoting Skocpol). The same result can arise through
ideological polarization which has created an “empty”
center in Congress (p. 14, quoting Cameron). Moreover,
leadership PACs reinforce party discipline through the
power of the purse -- presumably overruling
constituent’s views in at least some circumstances, as
well as making serious deliberation and compromise
more difficult. Indeed, polarization within Congress
leads to filibuster and gridlock. Moreover, the
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phenomenon of politics as entertainment may well
discourage the serious discussion of issues in
numerous instances. (pp. 19-22).
Finally, new techniques may circumvent the need
for legislation or congressional supervision in an
increased range of circumstances. “Presidential
administration” can divert policy-making authority to
a partnership of president and administrative agency
-- particularly when broad delegations allow a
substantial spectrum of permissible choices by the
agency. (See pp. 25-26). In a parallel development,
the rise of strong, well-financed interest groups
furthers a system in which these groups can “bypass
congressional parties and deal directly with the
bureaucracies.” (p. 17). So here again is an alliance
that circumvents the policy-making role of Congress.
As a result, “national policy-making is a product of
‘a fully developed political and policy network
outside of the regular political process.’” (p. 18,
quoting Miklis).
This evident further decline in the authority of
Congress -- and the quality of its representative and
deliberative functions -- will be disturbing for those
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who think that, with all of its historical flaws,
action by Congress is the most democratically
legitimate (and ultimately effective) form of national
policy-making.

B. Congress and the Supreme Court
In the last decade or so, the Supreme Court has
embarked on a course of invalidating congressional
statutes that is -- in terms of numbers, at least -unprecedented in American history. This shift in the
Court’s doctrine may also seem to reflect a
devaluation and impairment of the role of Congress.
Yet there is considerable debate on the question
of exactly how important these decisions are as a
practical matter. It is not entirely clear, moreover,
whether the Court’s new cases actually withdraw
congressional power already acknowledged in principle,
or whether they merely refuse to recognize an
extension of authority. For example, several of the
statutes at issue could be viewed as relatively
adventurous new congressional initiatives to regulate
the state governments themselves, in addition to
private actors. In such cases, the Court’s “activism”
may represent a refusal to accord new congressional
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power, rather than a limitation of congressional
authority already approved.
Instead of attempting to canvass the entire range
of these developments, I would like to comment on two
of the best known of the recent decisions, United
States v. Lopez (1995), and Morrison v. United States
(2000).
Tushnet suggests that the practical effect of
Lopez may not be extraordinarily great -- and, indeed,
it appears that Congress may have successfully
circumvented the effect of the decision by a simple
statutory amendment. It is now illegal to possess a
gun within a “school zone”, if that gun “has moved in
or... otherwise affects interstate or foreign
commerce.” This is a requirement that would doubtless
be satisfied by the vast majority (if not all) of the
guns present within the United States. At least one
Court of Appeals has upheld this provision,1 and it
would be surprising if the Supreme Court struck down
the amended statute, given its remarks about
congressional authority to regulate the “channels” of
interstate commerce.

1

United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8 Cir. 1999).
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Yet the disturbing aspect of the Lopez decision
lies more in the nature of the technique applied by
the Court, than in the result achieved. As Justices
Souter and Breyer argued in dissent, the technique
employed by Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority
is reminiscent of the pre-New Deal court in its method
of dealing with commerce clause issues. Moreover, it
seems to devalue the principles of two central cases
of the early Court, Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) and
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819).
In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall set forth a
broad view of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause. This view should be read together with
Marshall’s more general proposition -- set forth in
McCulloch -- that Congress possesses a broad choice of
means to achieve the ends of congressional authority
set forth in Article 1 Section 8. Indeed, in
McCulloch, the Court had upheld Congress’s choice of a
means (the Bank of the United States) that seemed
rather remote from the various possible congressional
ends mentioned by Marshall in his opinion (and a means
that came into sharp conflict with state-chartered
banks, to boot).
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When Congress began to engage in significant
economic regulation in the last decade of the
Nineteenth Century, the Court cut back on Marshall’s
capacious approach by finding that “manufacture” was
not “commerce” and that any “effect” that manufacture
might have on commerce was an “indirect” and not a
“direct” effect -- no matter how significant that
effect might be in fact. The result was that, in the
view of the court, the regulation was
unconstitutional. The ex cathedra assertion of this
position without any real underlying justification or
argument was characteristic of this line of cases. It
was not until the mid 20th Century that this entire
apparatus was swept away in cases like Jones &
Laughlin (1937) -- and most notably in Wickard v.
Filburn (1942), which delivered the coup de grâce.
Justice Rehnquist in Lopez, however, resuscitates
this form of argument. In effect, he seems to impose a
double commerce clause requirement. First, Rehnquist’s
opinion asserts that the regulation must have a
“substantial effect” on commerce. But that is
apparently not enough. The second requirement is that
the subject being directly regulated by the statute

9

must itself be “commercial” or “economic” in nature
(both terms are used at different points of the
opinion). Yet there is some confusion on the nature of
this limitation. Rehnquist really never explains
whether the absence of a “commercial” or “economic”
aspect of the regulation itself somehow prevents the
regulation from having a “substantial effect” on
commerce -- or whether the requirement that the
regulation be “commercial” or “economic” constitutes
an independent limitation of its own. As in the preNew Deal cases, there is no clear argument justifying
the imposition of this particular limitation.
Rehnquist’s main concern seems to be that without a
limitation of some sort, Congress could regulate
matters -- such as education and family law -- that
ordinarily fall within the ambit of the states’
authority.
One might imagine a less old fashioned (or more
“realistic”) path to Rehnquist’s result. Indeed,
Justice Kennedy in his opinion suggests this
possibility, when he seems to indicate that a process
of balancing should be undertaken -- in which the
state’s interest in preserving exclusive control over
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a matter of traditional state interest is weighed
against the federal interest in regulating commerce.
But there are a couple of difficulties with this
approach. First, it is obviously open-ended, and does
not yield the (spurious?) certainty of the supposed
hard-line test set forth by Rehnquist. Second -- as
Justice Souter notes in Morrison -- it seems to
require the resuscitation of the concept of
“traditional state concern” -- a general concept that
had already suffered its justified demise, on the
grounds that it was totally unmanageable, in the
emphatic opinion of Justice Blackmun in Garcia (1985)
(overruling Usery (1976)).2 Yet -- especially in light
of Rehnquist’s apprehension that a statute of this
kind could open the way to a major congressional
regulation of local school decisions on curricula and
so on -- the approach suggested by Kennedy may well be
the more intelligible description of what is actually
going on in this case.

2

Indeed there are further echoes of Usery in the passages
in Kennedy’s opinion (as well as that of Rehnquist) which
claim that the Lopez statute would “displace” state choices
in the relevant area. The language of Kennedy’s concurrence
also seems to reveal considerable anxiety that the Court as
an institution not cede to Congress its last foothold in
this area of constitutional turf.
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On the other hand, balancing formulas often tend
to favor Congress -- especially because they emphasize
the difficult assessments of social and economic fact,
depending on unruly data, which go into this sort of
judgment. That may be another reason why the Court
ultimately soft-pedaled Kennedy’s approach.
But perhaps the most disturbing of the opinions
in this line of cases is Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion for the Court in United States v. Morrison
(2000). Here, I am referring not to the Court’s
commerce clause argument (which seems to follow from
Rehnquist’s opinion in Lopez), but to the argument
based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. (I do
not believe that Tushnet discusses this portion of the
opinion, but it might well be worthy of some
attention.)
In Morrison the Supreme Court struck down a
section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,
which allowed certain tort claims based on
discriminatory violence against women to be tried in
federal courts. Tushnet points out that certain other
sections of the Act -- not threatened by the Court’s
decision in Morrison -- may constitute more important
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aspects of the statute. But even if there are more
important sections, I would say that the Court’s
technique in this case furnishes serious cause for
concern.
The Fourteenth Amendment argument was based to a
significant extent on a series of studies undertaken
in a number of states, showing that women often faced
serious forms of discrimination in state courts. One
of these studies, the Maryland Study on Gender Bias in
the Courts (1989), was written principally by a
colleague at the University of Maryland, Karen
Czapanskiy. This study presents, in my opinion, a
devastating and utterly convincing case for the
presence of this type of discrimination. It may be
that, in some parts of Maryland, as in other parts of
the country, the situation has changed somewhat since
the study was written. But this sort of question is
certainly an issue that should be open to the
assessment of Congress, and not the judiciary itself.
In its Fourteenth Amendment argument, the Court
turned its back on the judgment of Congress. The Court
first engaged in what was to my mind a largely
irrelevant discussion of the state action requirement
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in Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. In order to uphold
this statute there was no need to dispute the wellestablished proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits actions by the State only. Rather, the
proponents of the statute could rest on findings that
the State judges, and the State courts as governmental
institutions, fostered an atmosphere of discrimination
against women which resulted in unduly unfavorable
results (as well as humiliation) on the basis of
gender -- particularly in cases, like the assault
claims in Morrison, that themselves evoked issues of
gender.
It seems, therefore, that the State action
discussion in Morrison is a red herring. As Justice
Breyer suggests in Morrison, the real question is the
question of permissible remedy: what is the extent of
Congress’s discretion in selecting a remedy to redress
a massively proven violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
On this point the Court found that in order to
justify congressional action under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress’s remedy must be
directed in some way against a discriminatory state
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officer. It goes beyond the authority conferred by
Section 5, according to the Court, for the remedy to
take the form of a shifting of jurisdiction from the
state to the federal courts, in order to provide an
alternative forum in which Congress believes that the
risk of gender discrimination will be reduced.
This result again reflects the drawing of a
conceptual line without much theoretical basis. In the
seminal cases of South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966)
and Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966), the Court held that
the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments grant power to Congress that is
analogous to the authority conferred by the necessary
and proper clause, or by the doctrine of implied
powers of McCulloch. In effect, the teaching of those
cases is that the enforcement clauses of the postCivil War amendments should be viewed for all
practical purposes as though they were additional
heads of congressional power under Article 1 Section
8.
In the 1997 Flores case, of course, the Court
found that Congress did not have the power to redefine
the scope of a constitutional right contained in
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Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment -- at least
where the Court had recently set forth its own clear
understanding on that question. Flores also perhaps
limited the scope of congressional authority by
imposing a requirement of “proportionality” and
“congruence” with respect to its choice of means to
achieve a constitutionally authorized end.3 (But, in
the context of Flores at least, this limitation seems
to reflect the point in Marshall’s opinion in
McCulloch that Congress would not be authorized to act
on a “pretext.”) In any case, the record available to
Congress in Morrison showed that the fears of gender
discrimination in the State courts were justified and
substantial.
Indeed, I would say that, if anything, the
statute struck down in Morrison more closely
resembled, in all respects relevant here, the
suspension of literacy tests which was unanimously
upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. The suspension
of literacy tests was of course not directed against
any discriminatory state officer -- the requirement
3

In reality this test may be similar to Kennedy’s test in
Lopez. To say that a federal remedy is “disproportionate”
may be little more than to say that the State’s interest
outweighs the federal interest in a particular situation.
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that Rehnquist seems to impose in Morrison. Rather,
the remedy pursued another tack entirely, in order to
achieve the enforcement of the substantive
constitutional right in the manner thought most
effective by Congress. As Breyer indicates in his
dissent, Rehnquist’s remarks to the contrary in
Morrison do not seem convincing.
Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment argument in
Morrison has, in my opinion, an intuitive validity
that seems considerably stronger than the commerce
clause argument in Morrison or in Lopez. These
commerce clause arguments are a bit of a stretch (even
though ultimately probably justified), whereas the
Fourteenth Amendment justification in Morrison seems
unanswerable.4
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The Court seeks to draw a comparison between the
record available to Congress and the Courts in
Morrison and statements on the floor of Congress in
the Civil Rights Cases (1883) that suggested that
there was racial discrimination in the state courts
that gave rise to a similar cause of action in the
Civil Rights Act of 1875. This point, however, is only
obliquely acknowledged in Bradley’s opinion in the
Civil Rights Cases. Moreover, while the general “state
action” principles of the Civil Rights Cases are still
firmly anchored in American constitutional law, it
does not seem to me that any sort of argument can
properly be based on supposed details of the holding
of the Civil Rights Cases, which was abandoned (on
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The Court’s refusal to give weight to Congress’s
findings of fact here (supported by extraordinarily
powerful empirical research), as well as the Court’s
willingness to draw new conceptual distinctions -more or less out of nowhere -- in order to justify its
limitations, suggests that the road for Congress may
well continue to be a tough one in the “new
constitutional order.”

commerce clause grounds) in cases considering Title 2
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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